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Measuring Oligopsony Power





Abstract   A significant increase of concentration in the UK salmon retail
subsector has heightened concerns about retail firms’ ability to exercise market
power in the purchase of supplies (oligopsony power). To assess the extent to
which retail firms have exercised oligopsony power, we develop a dynamic error
correction translog profit function to model the behaviour of retailers in the in-
put market for smoke, fillet, and whole salmon. Initial estimates indicated
violations of monotonicity and convexity conditions as implied by economic theory.
In order to ameliorate the problem, a Bayesian technique was used to impose in-
equality restrictions to correct the anomaly. The final estimated indices of
market power in the models were low and statistically significant but sufficiently
closer to the perfect competition benchmark indicating that retailers as a whole
behaved competitively during much of the period covered by this study.
Key words   Salmon, market power, error correction model, translog profit
function.
JEL Classification Codes   JEL-I, JEL-J.
Introduction
One of the most visible changes in the UK seafood marketing chain is that the su-
permarket rather than the fishmonger has become the outlet of choice for most
salmon consumers. The dominance of supermarket in the retail chain for food prod-
ucts, including seafood, has been exacerbated by mergers, acquisitions,
consolidation (Clarke et al., 2002) and the declining number of fishmongers
(Murray and Fofana 2002). The consequence for seafood retailing in the UK today is
a high level of concentration along the marketing chain. Such parallel increase in
concentration has raised significant concerns that large retailers may be able to exer-
cise market power over their suppliers and thereby earn supernormal profits
(Dobson et al. 2001). This market power that retailers or buyers in general possess
vis-à-vis their suppliers, has been coined as “buyer power” in the literature.
The investigation by the UK Competition Commission (CC) (2000) of suppliers’
relations with retailers indicated that lower wholesale prices in certain product cat-
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egories had not been passed on to consumers. This was cited as evidence of the ad-
verse impact on consumers of the large retailers’ buying power. This is consistent
with the predictions of economic theory which holds that retailers with buying
power earn rent by restricting demand for goods at the upstream stage and paying
suppliers a price less than that in a perfectly competitive market (e.g. Dobson et al.
2001). Under these circumstances suppliers find themselves worse off since they re-
ceive a price which falls below the perfectly competitive level. It is also consistent
with the CC’s argument that as gate keepers, retailers with buying power exercise
the wherewithal to boycott some suppliers by switching to new suppliers at short no-
tice to take advantage of a cheaper deal. The main conclusion of the CC was that the
large retail chains exercised sufficient buying power. In support of this conclusion,
the CC identified 30 business practices, which, if carried out, adversely affected the
competitiveness of some of their suppliers and distorted competition in the supplier
market. In March 2006, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) again signalled its plan to
refer the market for the supply of groceries by retailers to the CC for more detailed
investigation. The main reason for the latest OFT action was due to further consoli-
dation in the retail market since 2000. OFT published its review of the market for
consultation and took the decision in April 2006 to refer the supply of groceries by
retailers in the UK to the CC for further investigation. The OFT has not been alone
in raising alarm regarding the increase in the level of concentration among food re-
tailers. Academics and the popular press have also raised their voices regarding the
growing public concern with the spiralling power of the large retail chains (e.g.,
Dobson 2005, Blythman 2004, Lawrence 2004). Consumer groups and trade maga-
zines in the salmon industry, in particular, have made strong claims that supermarket
chains use their buying power to obtain substantial discounts from suppliers which
they never pass on to consumers (e.g., Fish Farming Today 2003).
There are few empirical studies of retailer behaviour in salmon industry in the
UK. Researchers who have conducted studies on market power have tended to con-
centrate on the oligopoly. In applied industrial economic research, estimation of
market power or price conjectures depends crucially on demand and cost functions
which are sufficiently flexible, allow the imposition of theoretical restrictions, and
allow for the derivation of the appropriate functional form. Previous research on
market power for salmon has relied on restrictive single models to derive market
power measure (e.g., Steen and Salvanes 1999; Jaffry, Fofana, and Murray 2003).
In this article we develop, in the tradition of the empirical industrial
organisation literature, an econometric model of firm conduct with the view to ex-
plicitly measure the degree of competitiveness of retailers’ dealings with their
suppliers in the UK salmon market. While our model complements those based on
the study of single products (e.g. Steen and Salvanes 1999; Jaffry, Fofana, and
Murray 2003), it makes a departure in that it uses a translog profit function which
allows for the study of several markets more efficiently. It also allows the imposi-
tion of regularity conditions as implied in economic theory using a Bayesian
technique as enunciated by Geweke (1986) and Poirier (1995). An important aspect
of the Bayesian approach, which we have exploited in this article, is the ease with
which it is possible to impose inequality constraints on the model when regularity
conditions implied in economic theory are violated. Terrell (1996); Chalfant, Gray,
and White (1991) and Geweke (1988) implemented a similar approach.
Concentration in the UK Salmon Industry
The industry has undergone a process of consolidation over the last 20 years. Since
1988 the number of active companies has decreased by 44%, and in 1999 15 compa-Buying Power of UK Salmon Retailers 487
nies (of 95) accounted for 70% of Scottish production (SEERAD 2000) (figure 1).
In 1992, only 3% of production came from sites producing more than 1,000 tonnes;
this rose to 59% in 1999. The number of firms actively producing salmon decreased
to 69 in 2004 in comparison to 132 in 1993; a decrease of over 45%. The trend
showed continued concentration of salmon production in the hands of a decreasing
number of firms. Similar changes are occurring at the global level where the top five
producers have a theoretical capacity of 800,000 tonnes of salmon and trout, which
is the same amount as was produced in 1999 (Intrafish 2002). As consolidation oc-
curs, and the average firm gets bigger, its role in the supply chain changes. Larger
producers can take on more of the initial processing of the fish and integrate verti-
cally. The result is a closer relationship between production and retail stages of the
chain.
The most important trends for the fish retailing subsector include the ‘one-stop
shop’ culture associated with increasing supermarket dominance and the increasing
demand for easy-to-prepare meals. Large supermarket chains have, therefore, been
much more important in fish retail. The importance of supermarkets in fish sales is
manifested by the concentration ratios for UK food retailing. According to the Of-
fice for National Statistics (ONS), in 1988 the largest five supermarket chains in the
UK accounted for only 32% of total fresh fish retail. By 1995 this share had in-
creased to 61%. Similarly, the top 10 only accounted for 36% of the total turnover
for fresh fish in 1988, but by 1998 this had increased to 71%. The market share of
large supermarkets in the total retail sales has increased at the expense of the
smaller retailers, mainly fishmongers. For example, the market share of fresh fish
sold through large supermarket chains has increased from 16% of the market in
1988 to 86% in 2003. Over the same period, the market share of fishmongers and
market stalls declined to less than 17% and 13% of their respective numbers in
1988. The overall picture of the UK retail market for fish is depicted in figure 2.
As supermarkets grew, they exerted considerable influence over the processing
and wholesale sectors, requiring them to meet strict health and safety regulations,
Figure 1.  Size and Structure of the UK Salmon Farming Industry
Source: Fisheries Research Services (2004).Fofana and Jaffry 488
packaging, and processing requirements. Only larger processors or wholesalers have
been able to install the infrastructure necessary to meet these requirements. As a re-
sult processors, wholesalers, and other marketing channel intermediaries have been
pressured into mergers and consolidation to meet criteria set by supermarkets
(Asche et al. 2002).
Theoretical Framework
Assume that there are n (not necessarily symmetric) processing firms in the industry
(indexed i = 1, 2… N) that produce a homogeneous product, salmon, using M inputs.
Also assume that firms use a quasi-fixed proportions technology in which there is a
fixed proportional relationship between the material input (whole salmon) and the
output (say, salmon fillets), but that uses other nonmaterial inputs in variable pro-
portions.
Theoretically, the behaviour of a firm is determined by its production technol-
ogy and by the economic environment in which it operates, both of which act as
constraints on the firm’s decision making process. Assume a profit maximisation for
retailing is producing a retail good, x, using a homogenous technology g(·). The pro-
duction function for the industry may be expressed as:
xg q v jj j = (, ) , (1)
where xj is the output produced (fresh fillet, whole, and smoke salmon); qj is the in-
put from salmon wholesalers; and vj represents non-salmon inputs, such as labour
and capital. The function g(·) is assumed to be a twice continuously differentiable
production function.
Furthermore, assume that the jth retail firm exercises some market power in pur-
Figure 2.  Household Purchase of Fresh Fish by Outlets in the UK, 1988–2003
Source: Sea Fish Industry Authority (2005).Buying Power of UK Salmon Retailers 489
chasing the salmon products from suppliers but acts as a price taker in all other in-
put markets. Let the inverse market supply for salmon input be given by:
cw qr v jjj =+ , (2)
where qj and vj are the salmon product and non-salmon input used by the jth firm,
respectively, and w and r are the respective prices. The problem of decision making
of the jth salmon retailing firm is to choose inputs, qj, at prices so as to maximise
profit Πj subject to xj = g(qj, vj):
∏ = −− jj j j px wq rv , (3)
where xj is the quantity of output produced by the jth firm; qj is the quantity of input
used by the jth firm; vj is a vector of non-salmon inputs used by the jth firm; g(qj,vj)
is the underlying production function relationship for output xj; while p and w are
the prices of the output, salmon input, respectively; and r is a vector of and non-
salmon inputs, such as labour and capital. Equation (3) is an expression of the firm’s
maximum level of profit that satisfies the properties of being positive (monotonic-
ity), non-decreasing in p, non-increasing in w, and convex and continuous in p and
w. Non-competitive behaviour is characterised by firms possessing some control in
determining their input and/or output prices. The optimality condition corresponding











































The mathematical notation on the left-hand side of equation (4) is the marginal
value product (MVP) for commodity input; while the term on the right-hand side of
equation (4) is the salmon retail firm’s effective marginal cost. In elasticity terms,




















where θj is the jth salmon retailing firm’s conjectural elasticity in the salmon whole-
sale commodity market, and η is the price elasticity of supply of wholesale salmon.
θj shows the ith firm’s perception of the percentage change in the purchases by all
firms in the industry in reaction to a 1% change in own purchases. Therefore θj with
interval [0, 1] can be interpreted as an index of market power of salmon products in
the retail market. The term on the right-hand side of equation (5) is referred to as
conjectural marginal input cost (CMIC) following Chen and Lent (1992), and it is
useful for detecting the degree of monopsony/oligopsony power.
Azzam and Pagoulatos (1990) also propose that the ratio θj/η be construed as an
industry-wide index of oligopsony power in the commodity market. The index re-
flects the extent to which retail firms can set input price below the marginal product.
It is clear from equation (5) that when the index equals zero, the condition reduces
to a perfectly competitive outcome, and when the index is not equal to zero, the con-
dition reduces to a market that is not perfectly competitive. With some mathematical






















where μq is the markdown. It can be seen from equation (6) that when μq = 1, the
industry-wide index equals zero and the value of marginal product of the commodity
input equals the firm commodity price. If on the hand μq ≠ 1, the index is not zero.
Following the intuition of Hyde and Perloff (1994), the expression for the oligop-
sonist price markdown factor from equation (6) can be expressed alternatively as μq

























In elasticity format, equation (7) can be written as μξ ϖ qq q = ; where ξq = ∂x/∂q · q/
x, which is the firm’s elasticity of output with respect to the commodity input, and
ϖq wq px =  is the cost of the commodity input relative to value of supply.
Following Appelbaum (1979) we incorporate non-competitive conduct, (CMIC
– wμq) into the profit function in equation (3) as follows:
ΠΠ jj pw r q = [, , ,] . μ (8)
Notice that output price (p), factor prices (w, r), and market power identification
variable (μq) are the parameters entering into profit function. Basically the profit
function in equation (8) maps particular factor prices to the maximum profit levels
achievable at those output prices and factor prices. Taking partial derivatives with
reference to choice variable (p) and (w), the first-order condition for profit





















where xj is the output supply function for salmon retailer j; qj is salmon input de-
mand. An assumption in the above formulation is that salmon retail firms in the
industry are price takers in the output and input markets. Equations (9) and (10) rep-
resent salmon retailers’ output supply and salmon input demand function,
respectively. The output supply and factor demand functions (9) and (10) are ho-
mogenous of degree zero in p and w; i.e., only relative price changes affect supply
or demand. The second-order conditions of equation (3) are similar to equation (8)
and are useful for validating equations (9) to (10). Specification of a functional form
for equations (9) and (10) allows the derivation of estimable supply and demand
functions to test for the significance of μq the price mark-down and for non-competi-
tive behaviour or oligopsony power in the market for salmon products.Buying Power of UK Salmon Retailers 491
The model specified so far is a firm-level model. As is often the case in empiri-
cal work, firm-level data are difficult to obtain due to confidentiality problems.
Azzam and Pagoulatos (1990) highlighted that due to the lack of data on individual
firm level, some assumptions must be made to enable the aggregation of the firms in
order to perform the analysis using industry-level data. One possible assumption is
that in equilibrium the market power parameter or the conjectural elasticity is in-
variant across firms; i.e., θ1 = θ2 = …θn = θ, so that all firms face identical marginal
prices. The implication of this is the linear aggregation of the output and profits of
firms in the industry (i.e., x = Σxj, Π = ΣΠj[p, w, μq, r]). It is worth noting that the
first- and second-order conditions that apply to firm level formulation also apply to
the industry model.
Empirical Specification
Empirical econometric models usually encounter the usual problems of choosing
which functional form of the theoretical model to apply. The choice of functional
form for supply and demand functions or production technology and quasi-fixity of
some inputs are among the problems to contend with. The problem is extenuated
partially by using flexible function forms (Sexton and Lavoie 2001). Consequently,
in some empirical studies, the production technology is often represented by flexible
functional forms (translog or generalized Leontief), but supply and demand are usu-
ally represented by simple linear or double log functions. Moreover, Perloff and
Shen (2001) demonstrated that linear models produced completely unreliable esti-
mates due to severe multicollinearity problems.
Taking this into account, we used the translog profit functional form
(Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau 1975) and utilised the duality concept. According
to duality theory, a production technology may be represented by a profit function
which satisfies the following regularity properties: linear homogeneity, monotonic-
ity, twice continuous differentiability, and convexity (Diewert 1974).
Assuming the Unterschultz, Jeffrey, and Quagrainie (2000) specification of a
profit function, equation (3) can be specified as follows:
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where the subscript x represents the output of salmon; q represents the salmon
wholesale inputs of fresh fillet, smoke, and whole salmon; and v represents the non-
salmon inputs. For empirical implementation, salmon products are assumed to be
produced from aquaculture. Using Hotelling’s lemma and substituting for μq, partial
differentiation of equation 3 with respect to salmon retailers’ short-run output sup-
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where sx = px/Π is the value of output to total profit; and px = px/Π is the value of
input to total profit.
Theoretical properties of equations (12) and (13) follow directly from the prop-
erties of the profit function and require that the output supply and input demand
functions exhibit adding-up, homogeneity of degree zero, and symmetry relation-
ships, respectively, expressed as:
sx + sq = 1 Adding up




l ++ = −− − = ∑∑ 0 Homogeneity
βxq = –βqx. Symmetry
While the above restrictions can be imposed on the parameters during estima-
tion on the profit function, Fulginiti and Perrin (1993) argued that monotonicity and
convexity are not general properties of the translog function, and they can be im-
posed with linear restrictions on parameters in translog models. Alternatively, the
consistency of the estimated share equations with monotonicity and convexity prop-
erties must be evaluated after estimation. Monotonicity condition can be satisfied
when the fitted shares are positive and convexity in prices demands that the Hessian
implied by the estimated price parameters must be positive semi-definite (Fulginiti
and Perrin 1993).
In addition, oligopsony behaviour of salmon retailers in the purchase of inputs
is tested through estimation of the price “mark-down” (i.e., μξϖ qqq = ). Recall that
ξq is now the retail industry’s elasticity of salmon outputs with respect to the
industry’s inputs, and ϖq is the cost of the salmon retail industry input relative to
the value of supply. While ϖq can be derived from observed data as the input cost
share of the value of the industry supply, ξq is unknown. However having assumed
that the profit function satisfies the aggregation property and the production technol-
ogy implied is quasi-homothetic;1 we further assume a constant return to scale
implying that ξq = 1. Following Unterschultz, Jeffrey, and Quagrainie (2000), ξq is
set at 0.5 to allow the evaluation of changes in the price markdown. Assuming ξq is
































Any changes in the price “mark-down,” μq, will be ascribed to the ratio of the opti-
mal shares of the value of output and the value of input. It is evident from the above
expression, ∂sq/∂μq < 0 and ∂sx/∂μq > 0. This implies that a higher price “markdown”
results in a lower share of input and a higher share of the value of output. Empiri-
cally, a statistically significant and positive estimate of the coefficient on μq in the
output equation and a statistically significant and negative estimate of the coeffi-
cient on μq in the input equation suggest the absence of oligopsony power. These
two conditions are central to detecting market power of salmon retailers.
The dependent variables in equations (12) and (13) are shares that do not allow
easy interpretation of the effects of prices on quantities supplied. In this case retail-
ers’ responsiveness to price changes may be appropriately measured by elasticities.
1 Quasi-homothetic production functions have expansion paths that are straight lines that do not neces-
sarily originate from the origin (see Chambers 1988; Blackorby and Schworm 1988).Buying Power of UK Salmon Retailers 493
The elasticity measures of interest are own-price elasticities of supply and demand,
as well as the elasticity of demand for inputs with respect to own-price “mark-
down.” The Marshallian output supply and input demand elasticities can be derived
from the profit share equations as θxx = –1 + Sx + (βxx/Sx), φxq = Sq + (βxq/Sx) for all q ≠ x.
These price elasticities are calculated at the sample means of the data. Convexity of
the profit function implies that the own-price elasticities are negative for inputs.
Data and Dynamic ECM Specification
Some of the data available for estimation were in monthly frequencies while others
were quarterly. For consistency we follow Genesove and Mullin (1998) in aggregat-
ing up to quarterly level. Genesove and Mullin argued that this was to ensure that
the estimated elasticity represents the long-run as opposed to short run. In addition,
under imperfect competition retailers are more likely to establish a price to reap
long-run profits rather than short-run gains (Jumah 2004). Therefore, the data avail-
able for estimation are defined as the average quarterly 1992–2004 time series for
smoke  () , psxit  fillet () , pwxit  and whole () psxit  salmon for retail; smoke () , psqit  fillet
() , pwqit  and whole () psqit  salmon wholesale prices; wage (wxt, wqt) in the food whole-
saling sector, private sector investment indices (rkvx, rkvq) for food and alcoholic
beverages; and the generated identification price mark-down variable (μq). The data
on retail prices were obtained from the Sea Fish Industry Authority (SFIA), while
wholesale prices were obtained from Scottish Quality (SQS). The wage index of
food wholesalers and the index of private sector investment in food and alcoholic
beverages were obtained from the Office for National Statistics.
We examined the order of integration of all the variables by applying the unit
root tests. We applied the Augmented Dickey Fuller test (ADF) (Dickey and Fuller
1979). The ADF tests the null of no unit root in the data against the alternative of a
unit root. Table 1 reports the outcome of the ADF tests. The tests results indicate
that all variables are non-stationary in level but stationary in first differences. Over-
all, the conclusion drawn was that all the level variables are integrated of order one,
I(1); a necessary condition for cointegration.
Having identified the order of integration in the individual data series, the next
step was to investigate whether or not there is a linear relationship among the vari-
ables of interest which are integrated of order one. If this is such a relationship, the
variables are said to be cointegrated and an equilibrium relationship exists. Since the
model contains more than two variables, the maximum likelihood method of
Johansen (1988) was used to determine the distinct cointegrating relationships
which exist among the variables in both the derived demand and the output supply
equations. For each share equation, both the trace and the maximum eigenvalue test re-
sults are reported in table 1. Both tests reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration
vectors since the value of the tests for r = 0 is greater than the critical values at the
95% level. In addition, the tests suggest that there is at least one cointegrating vec-
tor.2 It follows that the variables are cointegrated and that an equilibrium
relationship exists which can be analysed using an Error Correction Model (ECM).
The estimation of the economic models involving integrated data has been ad-
dressed using a number of methods. Ng (1995) specifically considers the issue of
testing the homogeneity restriction and uses a method in which the empirical distri-
bution of the relevant test statistics is simulated by parameterising the
2 Note that the max test rejected cointegration for the input demand equation for fillets, but the trace test
indicated a cointegration relationship.Fofana and Jaffry 494
data-generating process and using this as the basis for a Monte Carlo exercise.
Attfield (1997) uses the triangular error correction model (TECM) of Phillips
(1991), and in considering the theoretically implied restrictions also focuses only on
the homogeneity restriction. Reziti and Ozanne (1999) estimated ECM of Greek ag-
riculture output and input share equations derived from a translog profit function
using aggregate level data. Nested within this model are both a conventional static
model (STM) and three simpler dynamic models: a partial adjustment model (PAM),
autoregressive error model (AEM), and finite distributed lag model (FDLM). Reziti
and Ozanne (1999) adopted a sequential testing procedure to find the model that
best represents the underlying data-generation process. Their result indicated that
the data-generating process rejects the static model and simpler dynamic models in
favour of the more general ECM.
Consequently, we used the more general Anderson and Blundell (1982) tech-
nique as exemplified by Asche, Salvanes, and Steen (1997). We assumed the
data-generation process follows the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ADL) models
for reparametisation of the models used in this article. The ADL model is an extremely
flexible model for time series data and is often seen in the following bivariate form.
This can be written more compactly in vector matrix notation as follows:
yx tt = ∏ , (15)
Table 1
Stationarity and Cointegration Tests for Variables in the Oligopsony Model, 1992–2003
Variable Unit Root Test
Level First Difference Cointegration Test
Constant Constant
Constant + Trend Constant Included
Included Included Included + Trend ξMax ξTrace
s1x –2.65 –2.78 –10.61* –10.46* 64.59* 233.8*
s2x –2.39 –2.40 –4.61* –4.47* 66.74* 236.9*
s3x –2.33 –2.27 10.47* –7.82* 57.74** 221.1*
s1q –0.54 –1.93 –10.88* –9.52* 60.26** 229.0*
s2q –1.03 –1.23 –9.57* –9.55* 44.69 202.9**
s3q –2.78 –1.59 –2.52 –4.39* 58.39** 229.0*
β1xq –1.60 –1.62 –3.15** –3.38
β2xq –2.12 –1.71 –3.08** –3.45
β3xq –1.78 –1.43 –6.74* –6.05*
β1qx –1.98 –2.79 –9.11* –8.47*
β2qx –1.43 –1.93 –6.36* –6.36*
β3qx –2.81 –1.99 –6.34* –6.61*
rinv –2.16 –1.02 –9.04* –9.75*
rwages –1.14 –1.48 –5.11* –5.07*
μq –2.79 –2.78 –6.72* –6.72*
μq –1.59 –2.80 –5.45* –5.38*
μq –1.49 –2.31 –3.39** 3.42
* significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level.Buying Power of UK Salmon Retailers 495
where yt is a n-vector of budget shares; xt is a k-vector of intercept, own price, price
of other salmon products, and expenditure variables; and Π is the (n×k) matrix of
long-run AIDS parameters. Equation (15) represents the long-run, equilibrium posi-
tion. In the short run, after changes in any of the elements of xt, the system may be
‘out of equilibrium’ for some periods as full adjustment to the equilibrium is de-
layed by inertia that is due to transaction costs, habits, and imperfect information.
However, the systems of equations as a whole may be classified as ‘cointegrating’ if
any such disequilibrium diminishes towards zero for all products over time. This dy-
namic process of adjustment may be modelled by a vector-autoregressive,
distributed lag (VARDL(r, q)) model:
BLy GLx e tt t () () , =+ (16)
where:
  








** () () == =




where B(L) and (L) are matrix polynomials of orders r and q, respectively, in the lag
operator L, and εt is an independent, identically distributed random disturbance vec-
tor. In practice, estimation is simplified if the order of the polynomials is identical,
r = q. Determining the value of q is often accomplished by estimating an initial,
relatively high-order VARDL, then testing down for shorter maximum lags in an at-
tempt to obtain a parsimonious, but data-consistent model. Since researchers have
often found that relatively low-order vector-autoregressive models will generally
suffice in cointegration analysis of seasonally unadjusted data (Johansen 1995), the
decision was taken to carry out all estimation and inference within the context of a
relatively parsimonious, first-order VARDL (q = 1).
Given that the inverse exists, the long-run structure implied by equation (16) is
shown as:































Equation (17) can be reparameterised to give an observationally equivalent set of
equations of the form:
D y t B L D w tG L D x tBy tpGx t qe t () – ( ) () ( ) ˜() ()( ) ()( ) () , ** =+ −− + − + 11 (18)
where the tilde indicates that the column for the most constant term has been de-
leted. Since the dependent variable vector in both the AIDS and translog models
adds up to unity, the adding up restrictions linked with equations (17) and (18) are:
′ = ′ =… − ′ == … − ′ = ′
′ = ′ =+
iB im i p i i q iB k i
ii k
ii i ,, ,, ,, , , ( )
( ....... ) ( ) ( ..... ).
*
*
11 0 01 1
100 0 1 10 0 0
Γ
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The covariance matrix of the equation system in (18) is singular due to the adding
up conditions. As a result, the system has a potential redundant variable problem
since the vectors of the lagged dependent variables that sum to unity appear in each
equation. Anderson and Blundell (1982) solved this problem by deleting one vari-
able in the dependent variable vector, which also implies that the last column is
subtracted from the other columns in each B*
i matrix. The covariance matrix of the
system equations in (18) is still singular, as the left-hand side of the equation sums
to zero. As a result, one equation is dropped before estimation of the model. The in-
variance property to which equation is to be deleted also applies in this type of
system. Letting the subscript on a matrix denote the deletion of the last row and a
superscript denote a n(n – 1) dimensional matrix, the system to be estimated is then:




nn () ( ) () ( ) ˜() () ( ) ()( ) () . = − + −− + − +
* * 11 ε (19)
All the parameters in equation (18) may be retrieved from (19) using the adding up
conditions. Equation (19) provides a template for re-parametising a dynamic ECM
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where εit, sik, and ϖ are the error terms, quarterly dummy variables, and parameter
to be estimated in the demand and supply equation, respectively. The inclusion of
seasonal dummies is based on previous salmon demand and supply studies, which
indicate that seasonality is important in the industry (Steen and Salvanes 1999;
Asche, Salvanes, and Steen 1997). All other variables in equations (20) and (21) are
as defined previously. The specification of equation (21) means that retailers’ de-
mand for input does not only depend on its own price but also on the price of the
product at the retail level. For the supply equation (21), the supply of salmon prod-
uct at retail level does not only depend on its own price, but also on the price of the
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Empirical Results
The determination of oligopsony power of salmon retailers involved the simulta-
neous estimation of the ECM translog input derived demand and output supply
models; equations (20) and (21), respectively. Input prices, output prices, and all
nominal variables were deflated by the consumer price index. This implicitly im-
poses the homogeneity property in the supply and demand functions. Symmetry
conditions are imposed during the estimation procedure. The systems of two input-
derived demand and supply equations for smoke and fillet salmon products were
estimated simultaneously using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) proce-
dure (Zellner 1962). The third equation for whole salmon from each system was
deleted because of singularity of the variance matrix for all four equations, and pa-
rameters of that equation were obtained through the homogeneity and symmetry
restrictions. By iterating over both the parameters and the error variance-covariance
matrix, the estimates obtained are invariant to the equation chosen for deletion
(Barten 1969). Seasonality was taken into account by using quarterly seasonal dum-
mies S1, S2, and S3. Lagging the dependent share equations by one period was
sufficient to get rid of any autocorrelation problems.
Since the parameters are first- and second-order logarithmic derivatives of the
profit function evaluated at the approximation point, economic theory provides no
prior expectations about their signs (Weaver 1983). The validation of the models
must rely on: the overall fit of the system; significance of the coefficients; and
whether or not the estimated profit function satisfies the monotonicity, convexity,
and symmetry conditions. While the properties of homogeneity and symmetry were
imposed, monotonicity was tested using the estimated parameters to predict shares
at each data point. The monotonicity property is satisfied when predicted shares are
positive at each data point. For convexity in prices, all own-price elasticities should
have the expected signs; that is, positive for output supply and negative for input de-
mand (Chambers 1988).
The preliminary estimates of the parameter from the systems of equations for
output supply and input derived demand are reported in the Appendix in tables A1
and A2, respectively. The Appendix also provides a brief analysis of the results of
the unrestricted model. In all, the diagnostics of the model in terms of R2, variance
of the models for the value-added products, are within acceptable ranges. However,
few parameter estimates from the unrestricted models are statistically significant at
the 1% and 5% levels. Notably, the models violated the monotonicity, concavity, and
convexity conditions implied by economic theory. In addition, the elasticities esti-
mated from these models were also of the wrong signs. To be consistent with the
behavioural postulates of economic theory, the estimated models must satisfy all or
at least most of the properties of a well-behaved profit function that result from
profit maximisation hypotheses. Therefore, this problem must be fixed to improve
the predictive power of the models. This article uses the Bayesian approach to im-
pose restrictions.
Imposing Restrictions using the Bayesian Approach
The objective is to obtain a consistent index of retailers’ oligopsony power for the
three value-added salmon products. To be able to do this, the estimated model
should exhibit comparative-static regularities following from economic theory. A
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globally;3 i.e., imposes restrictions on all values of the regressor space (Diewert and
Wales 1987). For most flexible functional forms, however, such restrictions come at
the cost of limiting the flexibility with regard to representing other economic rela-
tionships. For example, under the imposition of global concavity, the cost functions
do not allow for complementary relationships among inputs. Kleitt and Terrell
(2001) argued that global restrictions also cause the translog models to overestimate
own-price elasticities and bias price elasticities.
Barnett (2002) and Barnett and Pasupathy (2003) argued that the ‘monotonicity’
regularity condition has been mostly disregarded in estimation, leading to question-
able interpretability of the resultant empirical economic models. A fundamental
difficulty, however, is that imposing both curvature and monotonicity can dilute the
property of second-order flexibility. For the special case of finite linear-in-the-pa-
rameters functional forms, which is the most common in empirical applications, Lau
(1978) proved that flexibility is incompatible with global regularity if both concav-
ity and monotonicity are imposed. Thus, maintaining higher order flexibility
requires giving up global regularity in favour of imposing restrictions locally.
The local approach maintains the flexibility property of a functional form if the
regularity conditions are imposed at one selected point of the regressor space (Ryan
and Wales 1998). The risk with this approach is that regularity may be violated in a
neighbourhood of this selected point. Because of this dilemma, the literature on
flexible functional forms is characterised by a continual investigation for new func-
tional forms that produce relatively large regular regions. Nonetheless, for a given
data set searching for alternate forms and applying and testing the regularity condi-
tions on a case-by-case basis becomes an arduous task that can be rife with
statistical testing and verification problems. Maintaining flexibility involves the im-
position of regularity conditions locally. Gallant and Golub (1984) proposed an
inequality constrained optimisation program to impose regularity conditions locally
at each observed regressor value. This methodology was further expounded by
Griffiths (1988) and applied by numerous authors including Terrell (1996) and
Chalfant, Gray, and White (1991). Compared with the global approach, this method
generally increases the fit of the model to the data. This study follows the local ap-
proach of imposing restrictions using the Bayesian approach to achieve
monotonicity and concavity. These constraints were imposed only over the region of
the ECM derived input demand and output supply equation where inference was
drawn.
As already discussed, homogeneity is implied by working with real prices while
symmetry conditions are imposed. These restrictions from theory represent prior in-
formation that can be imposed on flexible forms through equality restrictions on the
parameters. Chalfant, Gray, and White (1991) highlighted that such restrictions re-
duce the dimensionality of the parameter space when systems of equations based on
these forms are estimated. For example, homogeneity and symmetry provide consid-
erable gains in degrees of freedom. Prior information taking the form of an
inequality restriction is less informative than such equality restrictions, in the sense
that this information serves to truncate the parameter space, rather than reduce the
number of free parameters. Conventional approaches to estimation do not permit the
formal inclusion of such information (Judge et al. 1988). Chalfant, Gray, and White
(1991) argued that the problem of prior beliefs that take the form of inequality con-
straints is easily handled in the context of Bayesian inference.4
3 It is possible to impose global curvature restrictions, for example, using eigenvalue decomposition
methods and methods involving Cholesky factorisation (e.g., Coelli and Perelman 1996).
4 See Griffiths (1988) and Chalfant, Gray, and White (1991) for an excellent introduction to inequality
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To describe the method, a data-generating process was first assumed. It was also
assumed that input and output prices may be treated as exogenous, so that the pa-
rameters of the system of n – 1 equations for profit shares could be estimated using
SUR. As is well known, the equation for the nth profit share cannot be included
without implying a singular contemporaneous covariance matrix for the error terms
in the n share equations (Barten 1969). But deleting the nth share and using restric-
tions on the parameters allows the complete set of parameter estimates to be
obtained. Use of iterated SUR was shown by Barten to lead to maximum-likelihood
estimates that are invariant to the equation chosen for deletion. It is assumed that
each time period’s n – 1 vector of errors, and therefore the vector of profit shares,
follows the multivariate normal distribution.
Using the Bayesian procedure as outlined by Griffiths (1988) and Chalfant,
Gray, and White (1991) suggest that the basic idea is to compute Bayes estimates as
the mean of truncated multivariate t-posterior. For instance, let us assume the pa-
rameter estimates  ˆ β with a variance-covariance estimate V(ˆ) β  distribution.
Empirical implementation of the Bayesian approach involves the use of Monte Carlo
numerical integration that is implemented by generating replication from multivari-
ate t-distribution. At each replication i, the vector wi is drawn from a NV (,( ˆ)) 0 β  and
draws another vector zi from a χ2 distribution with say, v degrees of freedom. This
procedure was followed to obtain a sample size of 500,000 replications (including
antithetic replications) from the multivariate t-distribution with six restrictions,
which is also equivalent to the degrees of freedom.
Results and Theoretical Validation of the Constrained Models
In all, four equations were estimated, that is two equations each from the derived
demand and supply functions. The parameter estimates and standard errors are given
in table 2 for the constrained output supply equation and table 3 for the input de-
mand equation. Not surprisingly, given the estimation technique employed here,
nearly all of the parameter estimates appear to be significantly different from zero.
The intuition of imposing constraints on the model is better understood by
checking whether the model satisfies the theoretical properties of the function from
which it is derived. Homogeneity and symmetry were imposed in the estimation pro-
cess but monotonicity and convexity were not. Most of the predicted shares are
positive, implying that the translog profit function largely satisfies the property of
monotonicity. In an economic sense, this implies there are no negative profits for
salmon when inputs are perfectly variable. The property of convexity in prices was
ascertained by the sign of the estimated demand and supply elasticities.5 The own
price derived demand elasticities for smoke and fillets are –0.24 (0.0001) and –0.31
(0.162), respectively, while the own price supply elasticities are 0.12 (0.0002) and
0.27 (0.003) for smoke and fillets, respectively.6 A convex profit function implies
that retailers can always keep output and cost constant but still increase profit with
an increase in output price. This is the first study that estimates the demand and sup-
ply elasticities for salmon retailers in the UK, so comparison cannot be made with
any other study.
5 Convexity is checked by computing the eigenvalues of the sub-matrix of estimated price coefficients
which must be non-negative and at least one should be zero for positive semi-definiteness. The price
coefficients of the long-run parameters in each equation were used to estimate eigenvalues. The eigen-
value tests for both input demand and output supply largely satisfy the condition for positive semi-defi-
niteness.
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Table 3
Constrained Results of the Input Derived Demand
Smoke Fillet
Numerical Numerical
Variable Parameter Standard Error Parameter Standard Error
Δs1qt–1 –0.0615* 0.0005 0.0160* 0.0002
ln Δp1qqt –0.0016* 0.0004 –0.0062* 0.0002
ln Δp1qxt –0.0131* 0.0003 –0.0126* 0.0001
ln Δrinvt –0.0486* 0.0008 0.0541* 0.0003
ln Δrwagest –0.1442* 0.0012 –0.0102* 0.0004
ln Δμiqt –0.1258* 0.0002 –0.0397* 0.0000
ln Δp1qqt–1 0.0305* 0.0004 0.0020* 0.0002
ln Δp1qxt–1 –0.0120* 0.0003 –0.0016* 0.0001
ln Δrinvt–1 –0.1209* 0.0008 0.0441* 0.0003
ln Δrwagest–1 0.0973* 0.0011 –0.0639* 0.0004
ln Δμiqt–1 –0.0353* 0.0005 0.0143* 0.0002
ln p1qqt–2 0.0119* 0.0001 0.0138* 0.0001
ln p1qxt–2 –0.311* 0.0001 –0.241* 0.0001
ln rinvt–2 0.0172* 0.0004 0.0157* 0.0002
ln rwagest–2 –0.0330* 0.0006 –0.0216* 0.0003
ln μiqt–2 –0.0028* 0.0002 –0.0003* 0.0000
S2 –0.0514* 0.0003 0.0000 0.0001
S3 0.0008* 0.0004 –0.0214* 0.0001
S4 0.1163* 0.0003 –0.0270* 0.0001
* significant at the 1% level.
Table 2
Constrained Results of the Output Supply
Smoke Fillet
Numerical Numerical
Variable Parameter Standard Error Parameter Standard Error
Δs1xt–1 –0.0952* 0.0004 –0.0298* 0.0006
ln Δ p1xxt 0.0289* 0.0004 –0.0344* 0.0005
ln Δ p1xqt 0.0057* 0.0003 –0.0066* 0.0003
ln Δ rinvt –0.1713* 0.0008 0.1679* 0.0010
ln Δ rwagest –0.1780* 0.0011 0.0957* 0.0013
ln Δ μiqt 0.0796* 0.0002 0.0085* 0.0001
ln Δ p1xxt–1 0.0854* 0.0004 –0.0519* 0.0005
ln Δ p1xqt–1 0.0236* 0.0003 0.0192* 0.0003
ln Δ rinvt–1 –0.1993* 0.0008 0.0935* 0.0010
ln Δ rwagest–1 0.2014* 0.0011 –0.3446* 0.0013
ln Δ μiqt–1 0.0356* 0.0002 –0.0055* 0.0001
ln p1xxt–2 0.312* 0.0001  0.338* 0.0001
ln p1xqt–2 –0.0111* 0.0001 –0.0141* 0.0001
ln rinvt–2 0.0122* 0.0004 0.0168* 0.0005
ln rwagest–2 –0.0266* 0.0006 –0.0067* 0.0008
ln μiqt–2 0.0078* 0.0002 0.0097* 0.0001
S2 –0.0695* 0.0003 0.0183* 0.0003
S3 0.0181* 0.0004 –0.0347* 0.0004
S4 0.1826* 0.0003 –0.1657* 0.0004
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Although the aforementioned discussion of the empirical results is insightful, a
key component of any market power study is the conduct market power parameters
attached to ln μiqt–2, an equivalent of price “mark-down” which are reported in tables
2 and 3. The estimated mark-down parameters from the supply and derived demand
equations for smoke salmon are 0.0078 and –0.0028, respectively; while the mark-
down parameters from the supply and derived demand equation for salmon fillets
are 0.0097 and –0.0003, respectively. While the estimated parameter is statistically
significant, the estimated parameters are sufficiently closer to zero to conclude that
retailers do not have oligopsony power over their suppliers. A possible explanation
for this finding is that retailers as a whole behaved competitively during much or
most of the period covered by this study. This possibility seems likely, especially
when one considers that oligopsony power is very small in several studies of the
similarly concentrated agricultural product retailing sector. In this regard, the results
are largely in agreement with those of other studies that have analysed the competi-
tiveness of salmon markets (Asche, Nøstbakken, and Tveterås 2006). However, it
should be noted that the results obtained in this article should not be taken as evidence
that the UK retail markets for salmon products are competitive. It could be the case, for
instance, that salmon retail firms engaged in anticompetitive conduct as industry
concentration increased, but that the information contained in the data is not suffi-
ciently strong to detect such conduct using the empirical methods employed.
Nevertheless, the signs on the parameters and the statistical significance of the pa-
rameters appear to suggest that there was a limited ability or potential for retailers to
exert some oligopsony power in the market for smoke salmon and salmon fillets.
Summary and Conclusion
Salmon products have now become affordable to the ordinary consumer, despite the
highly concentrated channels by which the supplies are obtained. In order to gain an
understanding of the transformation of the retail sector for salmon products, we de-
velop economic models of firm conduct based on the empirical industrial
organisation literature to determine oligopsony power of salmon retailers in the UK
domestic market. Three value-added products of salmon were examined: smoke, fil-
lets, and whole.
In the determination of oligopsony power of salmon retailers, the translog profit
function for each value-added product was specified as an ECM translog functional
form, and one output supply and one factor demand model was estimated for each of
the three product forms. Initial estimation of the models violated behavioural condi-
tions of monotonicity and convexity in prices implied by economic theory. To be
consistent with the behavioural postulates of economic theory, a Bayesian technique
was used to constrain the models by imposing local inequality restrictions on some
parameters to improve the predictive power of the models. The constrained model
estimates differ from the unconstrained estimates in several respects; the signs and
magnitudes of coefficients and elasticities associated with the salmon products un-
derwent noticeable change. The mark-down price parameters in the equation
indicate that retailers do not have oligopsony power over their suppliers. Neverthe-
less, the signs on the parameters and the statistical significance of the parameters
appear to suggest that there was a limited ability or potential for retailers to exert
some oligopsony power in the market for the smoke salmon and salmon fillets.
However, it is also appropriate to state the estimates in this article should be treated
with some caution due to uncertainties inherent in some of the data used. For in-
stance, the cost of labour for food manufacturing was used instead of labour in fish
processing due to inaccessibility of the latter.Fofana and Jaffry 502
An important limitation of this work and others analysing oligopsony market
power in the salmon industry is the absence of product differentiation and market
segmentation. By estimating a model assuming commodity homogenous products,
this study is ignoring the rapid change of UK retail industry. Retailers are expanding
their production operations to include the production of pre-packed and ready-to-eat
salmon meals via differentiation strategies, such as branding. However, the degree
of product differentiation is relatively unknown and data are sparse, which further
exacerbates the difficulties of researching in this area.
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Table A1
Unconstrained Results of the Output Supply
Smoke Fillet
Variable Parameter Standard Error Parameter Standard Error
ϖix  (Constant) 0.000 0.026 –0.020 0.033
Δs1xt–1 –0.089** 0.039 –0.035 0.048
ln Δp1xxt 0.013 0.032 –0.050 0.045
ln Δp1xqt 0.012 0.022 –0.004 0.026
ln Δrinvt –0.187* 0.067 0.170** 0.083
ln Δrwagest –0.129 0.099 0.103 0.117
ln Δμiqt 0.086* 0.015 0.009 0.011
ln Δp1xxt–1 0.081** 0.036 –0.068** 0.045
ln Δp1xqt–1 0.049** 0.026 0.030 0.030
ln Δrinvt–1 –0.218* 0.067 0.097 0.083
ln Δrwagest–1 0.250* 0.096 –0.337* 0.116
ln Δμiqt–1 0.049* 0.018 –0.006 0.011
ln p1xxt–2 –0.004 0.012 –0.001 0.017
ln p1xqt–2 0.033 *** 0.023 –0.001 0.015
ln rinvt–2 –0.026 0.039 0.006 0.045
ln rwagest–2 0.019 0.055 0.011 0.070
ln μiqt–2 0.027*** 0.018 –0.006 0.009
S2 –0.068* 0.027 0.023 0.030
S3 0.019 0.031 –0.032 0.034
S4 0.187* 0.027 –0.164* 0.031
R2 0.88 0.77
σ2 0.0010 0.0016
* significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 10% level.
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The R2 values for individual equations are quite good. The R2 for the output supply
equation are 0.88 and 0.77 for smoked and fillets respectively, and few parameters
estimates are statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels. For the input derived
demand equation, the R2 statistics were 0.92 and 0.87. Like the output supply model,
the significant estimated parameters in the input demand model are few. The LM
statistic values are measures of first-order serial correlation in the estimated models.
The computed LM c2 statistic values obtained for the input demand for smoke
salmon and salmon fillets are 4.74 and 0.95, respectively. For the output supply, the
computed LM c2 statistic values obtained for smoked salmon and salmon fillets are
1.99 and 0.75, respectively. Comparing the tabulated critical statistics of 5.99 for
two degrees of freedom with the computed statistics for both input demand and out-
put demand equations suggest that serial correlation is not a problem in the models.
The variance of the estimates (s2), which is a measure of the difference between ob-
served variation and predicted variation in the shares equations, is also used to
validate the models. Variance estimate for the smoked salmon input demand equa-
tion is 0.001, and the variance for the whole salmon input demand equation is
0.0001. In the output supply equation, variances are 0.001 and 0.002 for smoked and
salmon fillets, respectively. Low variance estimates are indications of good predic-
tive abilities of estimated models.
Table A2
Unconstrained Results of the Input Derived Demand
Smoke Fillet
Variable Parameter Standard Error Parameter Standard Error
ϖiq (Constant) 0.006 0.027 –0.007 0.009
Δs1qt–1 –0.055 0.045 0.015 0.017
ln Δp1qqt –0.017 0.036 –0.012 0.016
ln Δp1qxt –0.007 0.027 –0.007 0.012
ln Δrinvt –0.063 0.069 0.054 ** 0.023
ln Δrwagest –0.094 0.102 –0.003 0.033
ln Δμiqt –0.120* 0.018 –0.039* 0.004
ln Δp1qqt–1 0.024 0.039 –0.006 0.018
ln Δp1qxt–1 0.014 0.030 0.007 0.014
ln Δrinvt–1 –0.140** 0.069 0.043 0.023
ln Δrwagest–1 0.147 *** 0.099 –0.057** 0.033
ln Δμiqt–1 –0.016 0.043 0.013 0.017
ln p1qqt–2 –0.004 0.012 –0.001 0.017
ln p1qxt–2 0.033*** 0.023 –0.001 0.015
ln rinvt–2 –0.020 0.039 0.003 0.019
ln rwagest–2 0.012 0.056 0.001 0.031
ln μiqt–2 0.015 0.021 0.002 0.004
S2 –0.050** 0.029 0.001 0.009
S3 0.002 0.034 –0.022** 0.010
S4 0.121* 0.030 –0.027* 0.009
R2 0.92 0.87
σ2 0.001 0.0001
* significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 10% level.